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Between the Species
Arguing for Vegetarianism: (symbolic)
ingestion and the (inevitable) absent
referent — intersecting Jacques
Derrida and Carol J. Adams
ABSTRACT
In this paper I draw together the notion of the absent referent as proposed by Carol J. Adams, and the notions of literal and symbolical
sacrifice by eating the other — or ingestion — advanced by Jacques
Derrida, to characterize how animals are commonly perceived,
which ultimately forbids productive arguments for vegetarianism. I
discuss animals as being literally and definitionally absent referents,
and I argue, informed by Derrida’s philosophy, that it is impossible
to aim at turning them into present referents without reinforcing
symbolic ingestion by linking symbolic ingestion to epistemic appropriation or conceptualization. With this, I highlight the ethical
importance of discussing symbolic ingestion in animal philosophy.
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Arguing for vegetarianism constitutes a major part of philosophical and casual discussions led by individuals who believe
in the immorality of consuming, exploiting, and objectifying
nonhuman animals. However, it is much too common that the
arguments conveyed in those discussions bring about no practical consequences, that is, change in beliefs and attitudes on the
part of the non-vegetarian audience. Even when the argument
is sound, there seems to be a persistent resistance in changing
one’s perspective on the piece of an animal’s body on one’s
plate that rests there to be ingested. It appears that the connection between the abstract concept of ‘animal’ (or ‘cow’, ‘pig’,
etc.) and the piece of meat on the plate is at fault, forbidding any
change in the belief system of the omnivore. Carol J. Adams
argues that the reason for this is the fact that the animal, as a
singular individual, is absent — making her an absent referent —, leading the author to believe that the referent should be
made present to enforce the connection, in omnivores, between
meat and animals. Furthermore, both Adams and Jacques Derrida allude to a real and a symbolic violence (sacrifice or ingestion) inflicted on animals. While I think the absent referent is a
useful notion to understand the way animals are perceived, it is
also a key notion in epistemic relations which, as I will show, is
founded on symbolic violence. Therefore, the animal referent
in epistemic relations is absent and should continue to be considered as absent if there is to be a change in relations between
humans and animals, that is, if symbolic and real ingestion is
to end.

The Absent Referent and Symbolic Ingestion
Evidently, Adams’ notion of the absent referent aids in shedding light into why it is that the linkage between ‘animal’ and
‘meat’ does not hold for the non-vegetarian. Animals, as individuals, are the absent referents in any discussion about meat
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eating, because meat is not an animal — by virtue of its terminology: a cow is an individual animal with an interior life;
however, as a consumed good, it is beef or a burger; the same
with a pig who turns into pork once made into an object of ingestion, and the list goes on. As Adams says, “through butchering, animals become absent referents” (Adams 2015, 20). There
are three main ways in which animals become absent referents,
according to Adams: 1) literally, since they are killed to bring
about the existence of meat; 2) definitionally, considering once
there is meat, and not an animal, the way of talking about meat
drastically changes in comparison to the way of talking about
animals (for instance, a cow has a mother, and a relationship
with her mother, but beef does not; a pig was once a baby, but
pork does not go through infancy); 3) metaphorically, inasmuch
as animals’ experiences are appropriated by humans to describe their own experiences. In terms of being metaphorically
absent, the very pertinent example advanced by Adams, which
intersects vegetarianism and feminism, is the way in which an
abused woman might say “«I felt like a piece of meat»” (Adams 2015, 21). Feeling like a piece of meat, as enunciated by a
woman, can mean that the woman went through an experience
of objectification, through which her status as an individual
self was put at risk, and even violated, by another individual.
In simpler words, the woman was seen as an object of ingestion
(visual consumption, for example), just as meat is an object of
ingestion. Of course, with this metaphorical use of the animal’s
experience of being turned into meat the animal’s experience
is completely erased. There is not an indication of the relation
between the killing (and priorly, objectification) of one animal
and the act of turning that animal into meat, making the animal absolutely absent. Likewise, I think there is also an issue
with the usage of the phrase ‘felt like a piece of meat’, since it
also eliminates the sui generis phenomenological experience

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 25, Issue 1

66
Mariana Almeida Pereira

of being a woman within a phallocentric society, substituting
it for another violating experience, that of the animals who are
turned into meat. Concerning the absent referent, I will focus
on the two first ways. Reading Adams alongside Derrida (especially Derrida & Nancy 1991) proves helpful in the matter
at hands: while animals are literally turned into absent referents by being killed, as said by Adams, Derrida advances the
similar idea when speaking of the ingestion of the other (the
way human beings literally sacrifice other animals); and, while
definitionally animals are made absent, erased from the discourse, and forced to give up their place for a discourse on
culinary tactics and terms, Derrida’s notion of symbolic sacrifice applies to any other (human or nonhuman) who is objectified and turned into an object, that is a referent to the question
‘what?’, deprived of a phenomenological experience, that is,
an individual who is conceptually sacrificed by one’s desire
of exhaustively defining and ultimately knowing her. Furthermore, definitional violence not only forbids the way one talks
about the animal as an individual in her bodily characteristics
or phenomenological experiences, it also forbids the way one
perceives and speaks of the death that has brought about meat:
in the sense that “the putting to death of the animal (…) is not
a murder” (Derrida & Nancy 1991, 115) — while kicking a
companion dog to death might be considered murder, killing
an animal for food, turning a cow into beef, is not considered
murder in our carno-phallogocentric society.
Before continuing, I would like to draw attention to, and
clarify, the close relation between Derrida’s notion of a carnophallogocentric philosophy and Adams’ work on the intersection between vegetarianism and feminism, which justifies and
should incite further scholarly work on the association of both
thinkers, despite their theoretical differences. Derrida consid-
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ers that western philosophy is centred on the privilege of reason and speech (logocentric), masculinity and virility (phallocentric) and sacrifice (carnocentric), arguing that all those
terms implicate one another (for further discussion see Derrida 2008): that is to say that there cannot be a non-sacrificial
philosophy if it centres itself around the privilege of reason,
and so on. Similarly, Adams extensively ties violence against
animals and violence against women together in her insightful
book The Sexual Politics of Meat. In other words, both Derrida
and Adams accept that there is a connection between a sacrificial thought frame and a misogynistic one, affirming that the
violence sprouted is inflicted both on nonhuman animals and
women. As Adams says, animals are womanized and women
and animalized — the underlying impetus being the privilege
of human males and the subordination of human females and
nonhuman animals.
Going back to the main discussion; I understand that definitional violence can be problematized when linked to epistemic relations understood as epistemic appropriation. Indeed,
speaking of definitional violence implies the understanding of
a violent definition; in this case, the definition is not in itself
violent — that is, due to the fact that it is defining someone,
a being — but it is violent since it wrongfully defines a being: through definitional violence, a cow might be defined as
beef, making the cow absent regarding the definition and substituted by the referent ‘beef’. This is precisely what Adams
is calling attention to. However, I propose that when animals
are not definitionally sacrificed, that is, when they are defined
as animals, they are still being sacrificed through epistemic
appropriation. In an epistemic relation, a subject necessarily
addresses an object aiming at appropriating it for definitional
purposes. By definition, an epistemic relation is established
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between a subject and an object; that means that even if the
knowing subject approaches another subject (human or nonhuman), by virtue of the relation established, the latter subject will be made into an object. That is to say that through an
epistemic relation an object-turned subject is appropriated to
be objectively defined to be known. Meanwhile, while objects
can be exhaustively defined (a chair can be exhaustively defined through a combination of discourses such as chemical,
physical, geometrical, etc.), a subject even when approached
as an object — that is, even when the intention of the knowing
subject is to exhaustively define the object-turned subject —
can never be appropriately or exhaustively defined. By virtue
of the subject’s interior or phenomenological life, she resists
any attempt of appropriation. Surely one can try to objectively
describe a subject, appealing to her size, personality traits, biological composition, etc.; however, there is always something
that is beyond this objectifying discourse, and that is the phenomenological experience of the subject. What is more, there
can be no denying that animals do experience their lives, which
is to say that they have an interior or phenomenological life; for
this reason, animals too are subjects who are violently turned
into objects even when the definitional discourse has for a referent an animal and not a piece of meat. Violence here is exercised through the intention of making an animal being into
a referent, in other words, into an object to which an objective
description corresponds. With this said, making animals present referents in a definitional discourse, as advanced by Adams
to overcome definitional violence sacrifice, does not seem so
different from epistemic appropriation or symbolic sacrifice:
in both actions there is the intention of objectively appropriating a being who cannot be objectively appropriated. Evidently,
in both actions the phenomenological life of the animal is ignored and erased, to objectively capture her as a referent of a
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definition; concerning violence, then, it does not matter if said
definition is pointing to ‘meat’ as a referent (in the case of definitional violence) or to ‘animal’ as a referent (in the case of a
‘correct’ definition), because both actions are violent attempts
to conceptualize someone.
Furthermore, the relation between literal sacrifice and symbolic sacrifice or ingestion (as in, epistemic appropriation) appears to me to be of a logical nature. I propose that literally
turning animals into absent referents (killing them) logically
presupposes a symbolic sacrifice, otherwise individuals would
not maintain their meat consumption: it appears like the animal’s literal absence can be explained through symbolic sacrifice, which makes any pro-vegetarian discourse impossible
to make sense within a theoretical framework which from the
beginning objectively conceptualizes animals. This could be a
key to understand how arguments pro-vegetarianism usually
fail to influence practical changes. In addition, it reverses the
logic in Adams’ argument: she states that “animals are made
absent through language that renames dead bodies before consumers participate in eating them” (Adams 2015, 21), meaning
that after killing an animal, language “mystifies” (Adams 2015,
21) the animal’s dead body by calling it something like ‘meat’,
so that afterwards the consumer will willingly participate in a
practice whose violence is shadowed. However, I think objectifying language works priorly to that, enabling the butchering
of the animal by reinforcing a certain perception of animals as
being objects, which ultimately means that meat eaters would
still tranquilly participate in the violent act of eating animals
even if they called a piece of dead body present in their plate
‘animal’, or ‘cow’, or ‘pig’.
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A passage by Adams appears relevant to deliver this idea;
she says “the absent referent permits us to forget about the animal as an independent entity; it also enables us to resist efforts
to make animals present” (Adams 2015, 21). The understanding here is that the corpse on one’s plate is not a corpse in virtue of two reasons: firstly, the animal’s dead body is not fully
present, but solely a part of her body is (a leg, or a fragment of
her stomach, etc.), disabling the correct perception of a piece of
meat as a part of an individual’s body; secondly, the animal’s
dead body is not a corpse by the way language is used, as previously stated, transforming a pig into pork, or a cow into beef.
The animal, as an animal being, that is, as an individual, is then
absent. But I understand that this absence is permitted by language before the butchering of the animal, by the conceptual
apparatus through which linguistic beings think, which eliminates any phenomenological experience of the animal who was
killed to bring about meat. Thus, this symbolic sacrifice has
more to do with the will of making the animal an object, that
is a present referent, than the contrary. While ‘beef’ can be exhaustively defined (as an object of consumption with so and so
physical, nutritional, and chemical characteristics), ‘cow’ — if
we are to respect the inaccessible interior life of any individual
cow — cannot be exhaustively defined, in virtue of the individual’s phenomenological experience which makes her a singular
individual. What is more, presence, or being present, is a prerequisite of any epistemic relation; the object presents itself to
the knowing subject in all its finite characteristics. Thus, ‘beef’
can be a present referent to an objective description, but ‘cow’
cannot be a present referent. I will draw more on this later.
The animal ceases to be a singularity when the discourse
about her becomes an objectifying discourse on her capacity to
become an object of knowledge (symbolic sacrifice), and evi-
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dently it escalates making the discourse appeal to the animal
as a consumed good, appeal to her nutritional value for human
beings, appeal to her life as being there to be manipulated by
humans and to her fate as being in human hands, etc. (literal
sacrifice). Clearly, this sort of discourse happens before the actual killing of the animal: before a pig is killed and turned into
a piece of pork on a plate, she is already perceived as an object
because she is spoken of and conceptualized as something and
not someone, in other words, as an object to be identified and
ingested. It is well known that before being killed, animals are
kept in dire conditions. Thus, an animal’s singularity ceases
to exist long before she becomes a piece of meat on a plate but
begins when language authorizes a certain perception of her
which then authorizes her industrial breeding, and her killing,
which evidently can only happen through the way language
aids her objectification, her symbolic sacrifice.
To be specific, it appears that the killing of nonhuman animals, that is to say, their literal absence, is enabled by their symbolic killing as subjects or singularities, in other words, their
symbolic sacrifice; if so, there is a logical priority of symbolic
killing over literal killing. This understanding is informed by
Derrida’s notion of the text, which underlines the influence of
language in shaping the way we act in the world; when Derrida
states that “there is no outside-text” (Derrida 1997, 158) he is
precisely advancing this impossibility of thought about reality
that is not constituted by language. If thought is constituted by
language and actions derive from thoughts, then actions are
constituted by language as well. Reality, in this sense, is textual. To illustrate: if one had only three concepts for colours
(blue, yellow, and red, for example) then the whole spectrum
of colours would be conceptually divided, for said person, into
three colours, blue, yellow, and red. That person’s colour real-

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 25, Issue 1

72
Mariana Almeida Pereira

ity is different than that of someone whose concepts for colours
include five concepts (for instance, blue, yellow, red, pink, and
green). If someone else pointed at a green jacket and asked
what colour it is, the first person would probably say it is blue
(given the proximity in the spectrum between blue and green,
and given their available concepts). Language, then, shapes
what humans think and how they approach their reality: people
hold concepts for cows, pigs, ducks, etc., alongside concepts
like meat, beef or pork, but the way human beings relate to
animals is already violently marked by their conceptual understanding of animals as referents to concepts like ‘cow’ or ‘pig’
or even the overarching concept of ‘animal’. Having concepts
like ‘cow’ or ‘pig’ and using them thinking that through that
an actual individual cow or an actual individual pig is made a
present referent demonstrates a perception of animals as identifiable objects and objects of ingestion. ‘Cow’ and ‘beef’, in this
sense, both act as violent concepts which aim to delineate and
absolutely grasp a living singular individual. Through this, despite ‘cow’ being used to grasp the living individual, this symbolic sacrifice which attempts to conceptualize the singular animal is already informed by the same framework which enables
‘beef’ to even exist, that is, which enables the killing and literal
ingestion of a cow. That is so because the dominant theoretical
frame is one that prioritizes the epistemic relation (by calling
western philosophy logocentric, Derrida is also calling attention to this; logocentrism is also about the privilege of the (human) subject as a knowing subject, e.g., the cartesian cogito),
reinforcing the perspective of those animals as objects, and its
set of concepts is one that reinforces that perception, forbidding the establishment of a connection between an animal as a
being with a life — as a singular individual, who phenomenologically experiences her own life — and the animal who will
soon be made literally absent through butchering and be put
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into a plate. The same happens with animals who are not usually eaten, but explored for labor like donkeys, or explored for
entertainment like elephants. Humans’ understanding of these
animals as phenomenological beings is overshadowed by the
hegemonic understanding of them as objects, turning natural
their usage and abuse.

The Violence of Turning Animals into Present
Referents
Consequently, ingestion — or, to use Derrida’s term, eating
— begins when one sees oneself as a knowing subject, epistemically appropriating others, trying to understand them, objectively describe them and identify them. Therefore, animals
are already, in the carno-phallogocentric society, objects whose
end is to serve the human beings’ experience of ingestion, in
other words, the literal and symbolic act of eating. To make
present the animal whose corpse lays on the plate, Adams appeals (Adams 2015, 71) to argue for vegetarianism with someone over a meal of meat, which would hopefully disclose the
absent animal in the flesh being consumed. While it is true that
conversations around vegetarianism over a meal can turn uncomfortable for the meat eater, proving some triumph in turning present the absent body of the animal — perhaps because
it suggests a bloody image of butchering — it does not seem
like enough to convince a meat eater to stop eating meat and
start seeing animals as singularities. Any vegetarian who has
experienced this sort of exchange has empirically confirmed
the veracity of this failure. And this failure will be maintained
for as long as the symbolic sacrifice, or symbolic ingestion, of
animals is not highlighted and deconstructed. Accordingly, the
maintenance of this symbolic sacrifice is also aided by this will
of making present the absent referent, since that is a prerequisite of any epistemic relation: the objective description can
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be linked to its referent which is the object being described;
the referent is present when the link is maintained, however, if
there can be no link between an objective description and what
it tries to describe, there is an absent referent — in other words,
the description does not correspond to anything in the world.
When trying to describe a singular being — a human or a nonhuman animal — any objective description fails, given the actual non-object status of the individual, making the referent an
absent one. In this war against symbolic and real sacrifice, the
absent referent should not, then, be considered present.
Although it is true that the real animal is absent to bring
about meat, it is not true that the animal, when present, is conceptualized in a different manner from the way meat is conceptualized. That is to say that if meat is described in such a way
as to ignore its origins (the previous butchering of an animal)
and the violence inherent to it, so are animals perceived and
defined as beings with such and such characteristics, beings
who can be defined by science and can be grasped and understood by humans. Symbolic ingestion or sacrifice is patent in
both understandings of meat and of animals. Any attempt at
objectively describing an animal, as if she were an object like a
desk or a notebook, is already a violent act of ingestion: she is
reduced to an object without an interior phenomenological life
which in truth can never be objectively captured. There needs
to be a shift in the way human beings perceive other animals,
which implicates a change in the way human beings establish
relations with animals; violence begins with conceptualization
and permits animal consumption.
Beginning to illustrate a way of shifting this paradigm,
Derrida hints at a new way humans should approach others to
avoid objectively appropriating them:
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… one must begin to identify with the other, who is to be
assimilated, interiorized… something one can never do absolutely without addressing oneself to the other and without absolutely limiting understanding itself, the identifying appropriation (Derrida 1991, 115).
This is what Derrida calls ‘eating well’, which points to a
possible morally good way of eating the other; while it might be
inevitable that one eats/ingests an individual — there is always
the temptation to objectify the other individual —, there should
be a conscious effort to 1) see the other as an absolute other,
which demands to 2) limit this impetus to understand, to describe, to objectify. Respectfully limiting one’s understanding
of the other, and in this case the other animal, means stopping
symbolic sacrifice, which erases the other’s phenomenological
experience and which, in turn, converts the other into an object.
Thus, by looking at the animal and seeing in her an ungraspable interiority — after all, the animal looks back, she holds a
point of view just like the human looking at her — the possibility of limiting symbolic sacrifice, or symbolic ingestion, opens
up. However, and to restate what I have been discussing, one
can only proceed to this part if one acknowledges the symbolic
ingestion’s part in the myriad of real violent practices towards
animals. Otherwise, arguments pro-vegetarianism will always
remain inconsequential; the animal’s dead body will remain an
object of consumption even if, as Adams suggests, the argument is accompanied by a plate of flesh, because ultimately the
textual reality is still one that objectifies nonhuman animals.
Calling a piece of pork ‘pig’ will not resonate with an omnivore
inasmuch as the omnivore’s perception of reality is one marked
by this violent textual experience which establishes, in the first
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place, that a pig is already a ‘thing’ to define and consume, that
is, to symbolically and literally sacrifice or ingest. To harvest
practical consequences, before arguing for vegetarianism and
appealing to animal’s sentience, capacities to form emotional
bonds, etc., there needs to be an effort in changing the theoretical framework that engulfs those discourses, by showing how
in any discourse there is the tendency to symbolically ingest
the other, even before the other is butchered.
Moreover, if Adams aims at making present the absent referent, I argue that the radical impossibility of making the absent referent present should be welcomed. Afterall, symbolic
sacrifice rests on the will of knowing, of understanding, the
other: turning the other into something — rather than someone — knowable, identifiable, and describable. Only through
this can real sacrifice be justified. However, the other is always
that singular individual whose interior experience surpasses
the grasp of the knowing subject; her phenomenological life
exceeds objective concepts. This applies to both human and
nonhuman animals. Arguing for the impossibility of knowing
the other is the same as saying that the other will always remain
an absent referent of any descriptive sentence. In other words:
an individual cow can never be the referent of any descriptive
sentence, since herself as an individual who holds a phenomenological experience always exceeds and resists any attempt at
objectively grasping her. The referent in any epistemic relation
between two singular individuals is inevitably absent, but that
does not mean that arguing for ethical changes in the way we
interact with nonhuman animals is condemned; rather, accepting the impossibility of knowing the (human and nonhuman)
other leads to an understanding of the need for an urgent shift
in our relations: rather than epistemic, our relations should be
first of all ethical, relations of openness between individual sin-
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gularities, rather than relations between knowing subjects and
objects. This means, following Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas
1969), that it does not matter who the other is — her characteristics — for two reasons: firstly, characterizing the other will
always fail to accommodate the other as a phenomenological
individual, as I have been showing; and secondly, a true ethical
relation leans not on the possibility of conceptually grasping
the other, but on the possibility of unconditionally responding
to the other who is in suffering. Not knowing who the other is
means that the other remains a stranger, and so too the ethical
other can be an animal, for it does not matter, there is no need
to know, the species of the other.
Above all, I want to highlight the urgent need of considering
the ingestion as a twofold experience which carries an enormous ethical importance. Literally ingesting an animal implies
her prior butchering; similarly, symbolically ingesting an animal equals to symbolically killing her as a singular individual
which enables a false perception of her as an object to conceptually appropriate and to use and eat, thus enabling her literal
killing. Ingestion, then, carries more than the actual act of eating, but also the act of trying to capture the other’s phenomenological experience and erasing it, for the sake of permitting her objectification. The symbolic experience of ingesting
can therefore be said to be a violent act of ingesting the other’s
phenomenological experience; that is, a usurpation of one’s interior life. Indeed, in this sense eating does not commence at
the table and likewise the ethics of eating does not commence
when choosing what to eat or when thinking about the immorality of eating animals, but it commences prior to that, when
problematizing the conceptualization of other animals as an act
that could exhaust the animal’s being.
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Evidently, it is clear that when Adams is appealing to the
urgency of making animals present referents, she is pointing
to the urgency of disclosing that meat is only brought about
through the violent death of an animal, a living singular individual — with this disclosure, meat would start to appear,
to the meat eater, as what it really is: a dead body. Despite
this, I am bringing attention to the fact that making animals
present referents will not change perspectives, since humans’
perspective on animals is conditioned by a textual matrix that
privileges the knowing subject — to whom objects are present
— who grasps the animal and exhausts her life in objective descriptions. Given this, animal ethics or discourses pro-vegetarianism ought to take into serious consideration philosophical
discussions on subjectivity and epistemic subjects, since there
lays the justification for the primacy of epistemic relations,
hence, the primacy of symbolic ingestion.
To conclude, when Adams states that “one does not eat meat
without the death of an animal” (Adams 2015, 21), I would add
that one does not eat meat without the symbolic sacrifice of
an animal — while the literal absence (death) of the animal is
imperial to bring about meat, so is the theoretical framework,
and its set of concepts, that conceptualizes animals as definable and knowable objects, as present referents, erasing their
phenomenological lives, and enabling the omnivore’s refusal in
adopting a vegetarian diet.
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